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Ambiguity produces attention shifts
in category learning
Miguel A. Vadillo,1,2 Cristina Orgaz,3 David Luque,4,5 and James Byron Nelson6
1Department of Primary Care and Public Health Sciences, King’s College London SE1 1UL, United Kingdom; 2Department of
Experimental Psychology, University College London WC1H 0AH, United Kingdom; 3Departamento de Psicologı´a Ba´sica, Universidad
Nacional de Educacio´n a Distancia, Madrid 28040, Spain; 4School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney NSW 2052,
Australia; 5Departamento de Psicologı´a Ba´sica, Instituto de Investigacio´n Biome´dica de Ma´laga (IBIMA), Universidad de Ma´laga,
Ma´laga 29071, Spain; 6Facultad de Psicologı´a, Universidad del Paı´s Vasco, San Sebastia´n 20018, Spain
It has been suggested that people and nonhuman animals protect their knowledge from interference by shifting attention
toward the context when presented with information that contradicts their previous beliefs. Despite that suggestion, no
studies have directly measured changes in attention while participants are exposed to an interference treatment. In the
present experiments, we adapted a dot-probe task to track participants’ attention to cues and contexts while they were com-
pleting a simple category learning task. The results support the hypothesis that interference produces a change in the al-
location of attention to cues and contexts.
[Supplemental material is available for this article.]
One of the interesting research topics in current cognitive psy-
chology is the study of how people and animals adapt to changes
in their environment without forgetting memories of related
events that might conflict with their current knowledge (e.g.,
Anderson 2003; Speekenbrink and Shanks 2010; McClelland
2013; Vadillo et al. 2013; Smith and Bulkin 2014). Among other
mechanisms, an intriguing possibility is that changes in attention
to cues and contexts can facilitate new learning and protect previ-
ous knowledge from interference. A popular effect known as high-
lighting provides an excellent example to understand how this
process works (see Kruschke 2009; Sewell and Lewandowsky
2012). In a typical highlighting experiment, participants are
first exposed to a series of exemplars with two different features,
A and B, that have to be classified as members of category
1. During the second stage of the experiments, participants con-
tinue seeing AB-1 exemplars now intermixed with a second set
of exemplars with features A andC thatmust be classified asmem-
bers of category 2. The result of these experiments is that cue C be-
comes strongly predictive of category 2. For instance, if
participants are shown an exemplar with cues B and C, they are
much more likely to classify it as a member of category 2 than
as a member of category 1.
A popular explanation for this highlighting result is that dur-
ing the first stage, both A and B become very strongly associated
with category 1. Then, during the second stage, the first time
the participant sees an AC exemplar, the presence of A induces
him or her to believe that the correct category is 1. This prediction
results in an error. To try to minimize this error, attention shifts
away from cue A to cue C. As a result, the association between C
and category 2 develops easily and previous knowledge about
A-1 is protected from interference. The reduction in attention to
A when C is present prevents further learning about A (Kruschke
2009; Wills et al. 2014).
This process is relevant to extinction, one of associative
learning’s oldest phenomena (for review, see Dunsmoor et al.
2015). Since the seminal work conducted by Ivan Pavlov, it is
well-known that extinction does not erase previous conditioning.
If animals experience a number of pairings of an initially neutral
conditioned stimulus (CS) with a biologically significant uncon-
ditioned stimulus (US) they will eventually respond to the CS.
This response then declines in extinction when the animals are
exposed to presentations of the CS without the US. However,
the absence of responses to the CS does not indicate that the
CS–US associationhas been deleted. For instance, strong respond-
ing can reappear if the CS is presented in a new context. This “re-
newal” of conditioned responding has been extensively replicated
over species and experimental paradigms (e.g., Bouton and Bolles
1979; Bouton and King 1983) and has been the object of substan-
tial research in human learning (e.g., Rosas et al. 2001; Vadillo
et al. 2004; Nelson et al. 2011b; Cobos et al. 2013).
The standard account of renewal and related effects assumes
that once an association is learned, any subsequent learning of a
new association involving the same CS becomes context-
dependent (Bouton 1993, 1997), particularly when the associa-
tions conflict with each other (Nelson and Callejas-Aguilera
2007). In the case of extinction, once the organism has learned
the connection between the CS and the US, the subsequent pre-
sentations of the CS without the US do not delete the original
memory of the CS–US association. Instead, those presentations
are assumed to result in the creation of an inhibitory CS–US asso-
ciation (e.g., Wagner 1981) that counteracts previous learning.
Most important, this second association is supposed to be
context-dependent, which means that both associations will
counteract each other only if the CS is presented in the context
where extinction took place. In any other context, the inhibitory
CS–US association will not be functional and, therefore, the
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original responding to the CS will reappear. Note that the process
allows the organisms to store two conflicting associations bymak-
ing one of them context-dependent.
Although the study of extinction in classical conditioning
and human predictive learning has developed independently of
research on category learning, the mechanisms that are assumed
to explain why extinction becomes context-dependent are con-
sistent with the attentional processes that seem to be involved
in category learning. It has been suggested that when participants
are exposed to information that conflicts with their previous
knowledge, as in extinction, attention to the context is aroused
(Bouton 1997; Kruschke 2001, 2011; Rosas et al. 2006; Nelson
et al. 2013). This aroused attention to the context would explain
why subsequent learning depends so strongly on the context.
These theories—both conditioning and category learning theo-
ries—assume that contexts are naturally attended inorder to select
the currentmeaning of ambiguous stimuli (e.g., Rosas et al. 2006).
Though these theories have been applied to discrete cues, the rea-
soning applies equally well to contextual stimuli that are present
on every trial and incidental to the task until the point that con-
flicting associations are acquired. Attention shifts from the ambig-
uous cue to the context because this might reduce the amount of
error produced by the new contingency that the cue holds with
the to-be-predicted outcome (either a category or an US).
However, there is an important difference betweenmodels of
extinction and attentional models of category learning. Within
the former approach, once attention to the context is aroused, it
has been assumed to remain henceforth (Rosas et al. 2006). That
is to say, any subsequent learning that takes place in that context
will be context-dependent regardless of whether or not such
learning produces conflicting associations. This means that if a
cue is extinguished in one context, then any other association
that is learned in that context will also be context-dependent,
even if it is not directly involved in an extinction treatment
(e.g., Rosas and Callejas-Aguilera 2006, 2007; but see Nelson et
al. 2011a). The effect is robust enough in some predictive-learning
tasks that once extinction has occurred in a task, contextual con-
trol arises even with contexts and stimuli not involved with ex-
tinction, and even with contexts and stimuli encountered in a
different task encountered later (i.e., Rosas and Callejas-Aguilera
2006). In contrast, some attentional models of category learning
assume that the level of attention paid to the context can vary de-
pending on the specific configuration of cue and context (e.g.,
Kruschke 2001; see also George and Kruschke 2012; Uengoer
et al. 2013). For instance, if cue A is undergoing an interference
treatment in context X, and cue B is not, participants might shift
attention toward X to reduce error in the presence of AX, but not
when presented BX because paying attention to B does not pro-
duce a prediction error.
Although the theories of extinction discussed here assume
that changes in attention are responsible for the development of
context-dependent associations, none of the experiments con-
ducted so far has taken a direct measure of attention other than
using differential rates of learning as an index (Nelson et al.
2013). The goal of the present experiments was to provide a
more direct measure of attention, and examine whether learning
conflicting associations produces any general increase in atten-
tion to task stimuli as proposed by Rosas et al. (2006), or whether
that attention is more specific to the stimuli that produce the
conflict, as predicted by attentional models of categorization
(Kruschke 2001, 2011).
The experiments use simultaneous measures of learning and
attention in a simple category-learning task. In each trial, partic-
ipants were asked to classify combinations of cues into two dif-
ferent categories. Concurrently, they were also tested with a
dot-probe task (MacLeod et al. 1986) devised to measure the rela-
tive amount of attention paid to each of the cues. In a standard
dot-probe task, participants are presentedwith two cues for a brief
period of time (usually around 200 msec) and immediately after-
ward a dot appears on one of them. Participants are instructed to
locate the dot as soon as possible by pressing one key if the dot ap-
pears on one stimulus (e.g., the one of the left) and a different key
if the dot appears on the other stimulus (e.g., the one on the
right). The typical result of the dot-probe task, and similar atten-
tional cueing tasks (e.g., Posner et al. 1978), is that reaction times
are shorter when the target dot is presented on salient or
task-relevant stimuli (Koster et al. 2004). An advantage of these at-
tentional tasks is that they can be easily combined concurrently
with tasks to track howparticipants deploy attention to cueswhile
they are doing something else (Raes et al. 2010; Vogt et al. 2010; Le
Pelley et al. 2013).
The design of Experiment 1 is shown in Table 1. Participants
were asked to categorize several combinations of cues, each con-
taining an informative and perceptually salient cue (A–D) and a
nonpredictive and nonsalient cue (X) playing the role of the con-
text. Participants were instructed to categorize each pair of stimuli
(AX, BX, CX, or DX) as members of categories 1 and 2 using the
up/down arrow keys. For participants in Group Same, the cue-
category assignments remained constant throughout the whole
experiment. In Group Reversed, the category assignments re-
versed for half of the cues (A and B) on test. Although the design
of the experiment departs in some important respects from the
standard design used to study extinction (e.g., a punctuate, non-
salient cue plays the role of a context; and participants are trained
with two conflicting outcomes, instead of one outcome and its ab-
sence) it preserves the important components: Participants have
to learn contradictory information in different moments of the
experiment and, in addition to the predictive cues (A–D) that sig-
naled the correct outcome, they could nevertheless pay attention
to a nonpredictive and nonsalient cue (X).
During Stage 1A participants only completed the categori-
zation task. Starting from Stage 1B, the categorization task was
combined with a dot-probe task to track their attention to cues
across the experiment. Figure 1 depicts a summary of the structure
of each trial combining the dot-probe and the categorization
tasks. We expected an attentional advantage to emerge for the
predictive cue. Reaction times in the dot-probe task should be
lower when the dot appears on the attended predictive cue than
on the unattended contextual stimulus. The goal of the experi-
mentwas to determinewhether that attentional preferencewould
be attenuated when the cue-category assignments changed.
This attenuation would be consistent with the hypothesis that
Table 1. Design summary of Experiment 1
Stage 1A
4 blocks × 8 trials
Stage 1B
16 blocks × 16
trials
Stage 2
6 blocks × 16
trials
Only categorization Categorization + dot probe
Group reversed
XA—1
XB—2
XC—1
XD—2
XA—2
XB—1
XC—1
XD—2
Group same XA—1
XB—2
XC—1
XD—2
Letters A–D denote different cues with distinctive colors and shapes. X
denotes a dark rectangle playing the role of a contextual cue. Numbers 1
and 2 refer to the correct categories associated with each pair of cues.
Attention and ambiguous cues
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when a cue is involved in an interference treatment, part of the at-
tention shifts away from the cue to the context. Furthermore, as
stated above, the category assignments were only reversed for
half of the cues. This feature of the design allowed us to test
whether a similar increase in attention to the context took place
for cues that were not directly involved in interference, but were
nevertheless trained concurrently with an interference treatment
(cues C/D in Table 1).
Results
Experiment 1
Categorization accuracy is summarized in Table 2. A Group × Cue
mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) on categorization accuracy
during Stage 1 revealed that participants in Group Reversed
were slightly more accurate than participants in Group Same,
F(1,98) ¼ 5.14, P ¼ 0.026, ds ¼ 0.45. However, there was no effect
of Cue and no Group × Cue interaction, suggesting that within
each group, participants were equally accurate in their categoriza-
tion of A/B and C/D trials. A similar analysis of categorization ac-
curacy during Stage 2 yielded significant main effects of Group,
F(1,98) ¼ 54.22, P, 0.001, ds ¼ 1.49, and
Cue, F(1,98) ¼ 40.51, P, 0.001, dz ¼
0.64, and a significant interaction be-
tween both factors, F(1,98) ¼ 26.34, P,
0.001, h2p ¼ 0.212. As could be expected,
categorization accuracy remained high
for participants in Group Same, but de-
clined for participants in Group
Reversed. Furthermore, this decrease
was more marked for the categorization
of cues A/B than for cues C/D.
As we were interested in the relative
attention devoted to cues in relation to
contexts, we constructed “cue attention advantage” scores by sub-
tracting the response time epochs (see Materials and Methods for
the definition of epochs) to predictive cues from those of the con-
textual cue. No reaction-time data were collected in Stage 1A, as
the dot-probe task was not used here. In Stage 1B, participants
came to attend to the cues more than the contexts over trials, re-
flected as a faster response to the cue and a positive
context-minus-cue difference (see Table 3). A Group × Cue
ANOVA on cue attention advantage revealed no significant ef-
fects, all Fs , 1. An epoch-by-epoch analysis of these data is avail-
able in the Supplemental Material.
Figure 2A shows cue attention advantages during Stage
2. The interested reader can find an analysis of the raw reaction
time data in the Supplemental Material. Furthermore, all the
raw data from this and the following experiment is available at
https://osf.io/bhv2j/. As can be seen in Figure 2A, reaction times
suggest that reversing the A/B outcomes caused a loss of the cues’
attentional advantage (i.e., more attention to the context) on A/B
trials, with little effect on C/D trials. However, the datawere noisy
and the attentional advantage for the A/B cues in the group for
which the outcomes were not reversed was unexpectedly low in
the first epoch (we should point out, however, that the A/B
and C/D trials were functionally interchangeable in this group).
A Group × Cue × Epoch ANOVA on these data revealed a main
effect of Epoch, F(2,196) ¼ 3.32, P ¼ 0.038, h2 p ¼ 0.033, and a
marginally significant Cue × Epoch interaction, F(2,196) ¼ 2.86,
P ¼ 0.060, h2p ¼ 0.028.Most important, theGroup × Cue interac-
tion also approached traditional levels of statistical significance,
F(1,98) ¼ 3.45, P ¼ 0.066, h2 p ¼ 0.034, suggesting that the decline
in cue advantage in Group Reversed was more marked for cues
A/B than for cues C/D. Separate Group × Epoch ANOVAs on
cue advantages for A/B and C/D revealed that the main effect
of Group approached significance for cues A/B, F(1,98) ¼ 2.61,
P ¼ 0.11, ds ¼ 0.32, but not for cues C/D, F(1,98), 1. In the
case of A/B, the main effect of Epoch was also statistically sig-
nificant, F(1.88,184.54) ¼ 5.99, P ¼ 0.003, h2p ¼ 0.058. The rest of ef-
fects were far from statistical significance, largest F(2,196) ¼ 1.27,
P ¼ 0.283. These results suggest that when informative cues be-
come ambiguous, the attentional advantage that these cues
have over the uninformative contextual cues is lost. The effects
overall, however, were small and the crucial Group × Cue interac-
tion fell short of what is typically considered reliable.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was a conceptual replication of Experiment 1, with
some minor changes. In Experiment 2 we used a larger sample to
increase our power. Additionally, we included two contextual
stimuli. A factor that might have limited the strength of our ma-
nipulation in Experiment 1 is that the context was a constant,
nonsalient, and noninformative cue. This might have caused par-
ticipants to ignore cue X to such an extent that changes in relative
attention during Stage 2 were difficult to detect. During Stage 1B
Figure 1. Schematic of the sequence of events in a standard trial from
Stages 1B and 2. During Stage 1A the sequence of events was identical,
except for the omission of the dot probe.
Table 2. Categorization accuracy in Experiments 1 and 2
Experiment Stage
Group reversed Group same
A/B C/D A/B C/D
1
1 0.915(0.009) 0.910(0.008) 0.874(0.016) 0.875(0.016)
2 0.847(0.010) 0.917(0.011) 0.967(0.010) 0.974(0.006)
2
1 0.913(0.012) 0.907(0.013) 0.923(0.008) 0.919(0.010)
2 0.842(0.012) 0.928(0.010) 0.960(0.005) 0.961(0.006)
Mean proportion of correct responses in the categorization task for trials involving cues A/B or cues C/D,
collapsed across blocks. The numbers between parentheses denote the standard errors of the mean.
Attention and ambiguous cues
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of Experiment 2 participants were exposed to two different con-
textual cues, X and Y, both of which were relatively nonsalient
and irrelevant for the categorization task. The number of training
trials was the same and hence the number of trials in which the
stimuli occurred with context X was halved relative to
Experiment 1. Finally, we extended the length of Stage 2 with
two additional blocks of trials to improve the sensitivity of our de-
pendent variables. The full design of the experiment is summa-
rized in Supplemental Table S1 of the Supplemental Material.
We restricted the analysis of Stage 1 to the A–D cues when
they occurred with X, as these were the combinations of interest
on the test. During Stage 1A there were no trials with context
X. Therefore our analyses were restricted to Stage 1B. As can be
seen in Table 2, during Stage 1B participants’ accuracy in
the categorization task was similar for both cues and groups. A
Group × Cue ANOVA on categorization
accuracy revealed no main effects or in-
teraction, largest F(1,203) ¼ 1.94, P ¼
0.165. In contrast, a similar Group ×
Cue ANOVA on categorization accuracies
from Stage 2 revealed a significant effect
of Cue, F(1,203) ¼ 121.04, P, 0.001, dz ¼
0.77, Group, F(1,203) ¼ 44.76, P, 0.001,
ds ¼ 0.94, and a Cues × Group interac-
tion, F(1,203) ¼ 113.79, P, 0.001, h2p ¼
0.359. This interaction shows that cate-
gorization performance dropped in
Group Reversed with respect to Group
Same, although more so for cues A/B
than for cues C/D.
The analysis of reaction times to the
dot probe during Stage 1B reveals that
participants developed an attentional
preference for the predictive cues A–D
over the contextual cue (see Table 3).
Responses tended to be systematically
faster when the dot appeared on cues
A–D than when it appeared on cue X. A
Group × Cue ANOVA on attentional ad-
vantage for cues yielded no significant
main effects or interactions, largest
F(1,203) ¼ 2.07, P ¼ 0.152.
The most interesting results for our
present purposes are those related to
dot-probe performance during Stage
2. Figure 2B shows mean attentional ad-
vantages for cues across different groups,
epochs, and cue combinations. As can
be seen, these data suggest that, overall,
attentional scores were larger for partici-
pants in Group Same than for partici-
pants in Group Reversed. Furthermore,
this difference tends to be somewhat
larger for cues A/B than for cues C/D. These impressions were
confirmed by a Group × Cue × Epoch ANOVA, which yielded a
main effect of Group, F(1,203) ¼ 6.91, P ¼ 0.009, ds ¼ 0.37, and a
marginally significant Group × Cue interaction, F(1,203) ¼ 3.82,
P ¼ 0.052, h2p ¼ 0.018. All other main effects and interactions
were nonsignificant, largest F(3,609) ¼ 2.05, P ¼ 0.105. Follow-up
ANOVAs conducted separately for cues A/B and cues C/D revealed
that therewas amain effect of Group for cues A/B, F(1,203) ¼ 11.66,
P ¼ 0.001, ds ¼ 0.48, but not for cues C/D, F(1,203) ¼ 1.574, P ¼
0.211. Overall, these results converge to the conclusion that the
contingency reversal of cues A/B lead to a decrement in the atten-
tional preference for these cues over the contextual cue X. The ef-
fect tended to be smaller (indeed, nonsignificant) for cues C/D,
which were trained concurrently with cues A/B but were not
directly involved in a contingency reversal. Unfortunately, as in
Experiment 1, the crucial Group × Cue interaction missed full
statistical significance (P ¼ 0.052) despite the larger sample size
and the inclusion of two extra testing blocks.
Combined analysis of Experiments 1 and 2
The results of our experiments converged to the conclusion that
the decline of attentional advantage was more marked for the
cues directly involved in the contingency reversal (A/B) than for
other cues trained concurrently (C/D). However, the critical
Group × Cue interaction was only marginally significant in
both cases (P values equal to 0.066 and 0.052, in Experiments 1
and 2, respectively). These consistently improbable interactions
Table 3. Cue attentional advantage in Stage 1B
Experiment
Group reversed Group same
A/B C/D A/B C/D
1 26.71 (6.43) 30.54 (7.54) 30.63 (7.03) 27.14 (7.94)
2 43.07 (5.76) 31.98 (6.58) 30.16 (6.39) 33.65 (7.05)
Attentional advantage was computed by subtracting participants’ reaction
time when the dot probe was presented on cues A–D from their reaction
time when the dot was presented on contextual cue X. The numbers
between parentheses denote the standard errors of the mean.
Figure 2. Mean attentional advantage for cues A/B and C/D during Stage 2 test in Experiments 1 and
2 (A and B, respectively). Attentional advantage was computed by subtracting participants’ reaction
time when the dot probe was presented on cues A–D from their reaction time when the dot was pre-
sented on contextual cue X. Error bars denote the standard error of the means. Each epoch comprises
data from two blocks of trials.
Attention and ambiguous cues
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strongly suggest that a true interactionmight exist, although they
also cast doubts on the reliability of our dependent variable or
the statistical power of our samples. To overcome these problems,
we conducted a high-powered combined analysis of the data from
both experiments. Given that Experiment 1 included only six
testing blocks (collapsed in three epochs), while Experiment 2
comprised eight testing blocks (collapsed in four epochs), we aver-
aged all reaction-time data across blocks.
Figure 3 shows the results of the combined analyses. As can
be seen, overall cue advantages tended to be lower for participants
in Group Reversed than for participants in Group Same. However,
this decrease is steeper for cues A/B than for cues C/D. An
Experiment × Group × Cue mixed ANOVA yielded significant
main effects of Experiment, F(1,301) ¼ 6.85, P ¼ 0.009, ds ¼ 0.32,
and Group, F(1,301) ¼ 4.56, P ¼ 0.034, ds ¼ 0.24. The main effect
of Cue was far from statistical significance, F(1,301), 1. Neither
the Experiment × Group interaction, F(1,301) , 1, or the
Experiment × Cue interaction, F(1,301), 1, reached statistical sig-
nificance. Most important, the critical Group × Cue interaction
that did not reach full significance in the individual analyses
was now statistically significant, F(1,301) ¼ 7.26, P ¼ 0.007, h2p ¼
0.024, and did not interact with experiment, F(1,301), 1. Across
experiments, the attentional advantage for cues A/B was signifi-
cantly different between Groups Reversed and Same, t(303) ¼
3.71, P, 0.001, ds ¼ 0.43. For cues C/D, this difference was non-
significant, t(303) ¼ 0.87, P ¼ 0.383, ds ¼ 0.10. The combined anal-
ysis also provides some hint as to why the Group × Cue
interaction failed to reach full statistical significance in each indi-
vidual experiment. If this interaction is seen as a between-groups
(Reversed vs. Same) difference of awithin-participants (A/B versus
C/D) difference, then its effect sizemeasured inCohen’s ds units is
0.31. Even with the relatively large samples used in Experiments 1
and 2, our power to detect this effect in a two-tailed test was only
0.34 and 0.60, respectively. In contrast, the observed power of the
aggregate analysis is 0.93.
Discussion
The results of the present series of experiments suggest that expo-
sure to information that contradicts previous beliefs produces a
shift in attention. Specifically, when predictive cues changed their
meaning and were assigned to new categories, participants’ atten-
tional preference for the predictive cues relative to concomitant,
less conspicuous, and nonpredictive contextual cues was disrupt-
ed. This result is consistent with the predictions of some atten-
tional models of category learning. For instance, according to
the EXIT model devised by Kruschke (2001) attention shifts
away rapidly from any cue that produces a prediction error. This
feature of the model allows it to explain a significant number of
associative learning phenomena such as highlighting and block-
ing (Kruschke 2001, 2009). In our experiments, on the first trials
of Stage 2, participants’ previous knowledge of the categories asso-
ciatedwith cues A/B should produce a prediction error. According
to the EXITmodel, this prediction error can be partially ameliorat-
ed by diverting attention away from those cues. As a result the rel-
ative amount of attention available to process the nonpredictive
background cues increases.
As discussed in the Introduction, the fact that prediction er-
rors can produce these changes in attention to cues and contexts
might provide an insight into the mechanisms of one of the most
popular areas of research in animal and human conditioning.
Since the days of Pavlov, it is known that the extinction of condi-
tioned responses cannot be explained in terms of unlearning.
Even if these responses are reduced to negligible levels, there are
some manipulations that can promote a partial or full recovery
of conditioned responding (Pavlov 1927; Rescorla and Heth
1975; Bouton and Bolles 1979; Bouton and King 1983). These
findings suggest that extinction does not consist of the removal
of previously learned associations, but of the learning of new as-
sociations that counteract previous learning. The fact that condi-
tioned responses can reappear in some circumstances shows that
whatever people and animals learn during extinction is not al-
ways generalized to new situations. Traditionally, the recovery
of conditioned responding has been attributed to changes in the
context from the extinction phase to the testing phase (Bouton
1993, 1997). From this point of view, the associations learned dur-
ing extinction are bound together with a representation of the
context in which they were learned. These associations are only
expressed when the cue or conditioned stimulus is presented spe-
cifically in that context. As a result, if the cue is presented in a con-
text that differs somehow from that in which extinction was
learned, conditioned responses will reappear.
This theoretical view has become the standard explanation
for many learning effects related to extinction and to interfer-
ence in general, both within the animal conditioning tradition
and in human learning research. It also provides an excellent
background to understand why psychological treatments for
anxiety and fear disorders (usually based on ideas taken from
the extinction and interference literatures) sometimes fail to pre-
vent the resurgence of clinical symptoms (Milad and Quirk 2012;
Vervliet et al. 2013). However, a missing detail in this general
framework is explaining why the associations learned during ex-
tinction and interference become context-dependent in first
instance.
In a brief concluding comment, Bouton (1997) speculated
that when extinction takes place and an organism discovers that
themeaning of a cue is ambiguous, it might begin to paymore at-
tention to the context in case changes in the context prove useful
to predict when the CS will be followed by the US and when not.
The idea that changes in attention can explain why interfering in-
formation becomes context-dependent has stimulated an inter-
esting series of experiments during the last years (Rosas and
Callejas-Aguilera 2006, 2007; Nelson et al. 2013; Bernal-Gamboa
et al. 2014). But, unfortunately, none of these studies has directly
measured changes in attention while participants are exposed to
conflicting information. Instead, they have used attention to ex-
plain the effect of a context switch and the effect of the context
switch to infer attention. Here we have demonstrated the context
switch effect while measuring attention independently. Our
Figure 3. Mean attentional advantage for cues A/B and C/D during
Stage 2 test in Experiments 1 and 2 collapsed across epochs. The series
with the larger markers denotes the average cue advantage across exper-
iments. Error bars denote the standard error of the means.
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results confirm that learning interfering information does pro-
duce a change in attention, so that part of the attention usually
allocated to predictive cues diverts to nonpredictive and nonsa-
lient cues analogous to the contexts of associative learning exper-
iments (in particular the type used by Rosas and Callejas-Aguilera
2006). Ideally, future research should follow up our results using
alternative procedures to measure attentional processes (e.g.,
Livesey et al. 2009; Wills et al. 2014; Glautier and Shih 2015;
Luque et al. 2015).
Attentional models of category learning not only provide an
interesting framework to fully understand how attention is de-
ployed to cues and contexts in learning effects related to interfer-
ence and extinction. They also make some specific predictions
that stand in contrast with thosemade by some theories of extinc-
tion and interference (i.e., ATCP by Rosas et al. 2006). According
to EXIT (Kruschke 2001) the amount of attention paid to a cue
can depend on the specific exemplar or configuration where
that cue is presented. A specific cue, A, can be attended in the pres-
ence of a given cue, B, but not in the presence of another cue,
C. From this point of view, the relative increase in attention to
the context that we observed in the present experiments should
only be observed for configurations of cues and contexts that
were directly involved in a prediction error. That is to say, if the
reversal of categories in trials AX and BX produced a shift in atten-
tion towardX, this need not affect the deployment of attention to
X when other configurations, like CX or DX, are presented,
because these cues were never involved in a category reversal.
This prediction is partially confirmed by our results. We observed
a shift in attention to cues C andD following the reversal of cues A
and B. The effect on C/D, however, tended to be smaller than the
effect that the manipulation had on cues A and B and, in fact, did
not reach full statistical significance in the high-powered com-
bined analysis. Although the prediction that aroused attention
to the context is configuration-independent has received some
empirical support (Rosas and Callejas-Aguilera 2006, 2007;
Bernal-Gamboa et al. 2014), some of that supporting evidence
has been difficult to replicate (Nelson et al. 2011a). Experiments
exploring effects unrelated to extinction or interference have tra-
ditionally found that the attention paid to previously predictive
stimuli transfers quite well to new situations and new compounds
(Le Pelley and McLaren 2003; Lochman and Wills 2003; Griffiths
and Le Pelley 2009; Livesey et al. 2009), but some experiments
suggest that the amount of attention paid to cues can be configu-
ration dependent (George and Kruschke 2012). We hope that our
results and the methods used in the present series of experiments
will contribute to the resolution of this exciting debate.
Materials and Methods
Experiment 1
One hundred psychology students from UNED volunteered to
take part in the experiment. Half of themwere randomly assigned
to Group Reversed and the other half to Group Same. Previous re-
search with the experimental task used in this study (Le Pelley
et al. 2013, Experiment 3) suggested that this sample sizewas large
enough to detect anymodulation of attentional effects in amixed
experimental design. Participants conducted the experiment in
small groups in a computer roomwith individual cubicles. The ex-
periment was conducted on PCs with 15-in TFT monitors set at a
resolutionof 800 × 600. The experimental programwaswritten in
MATLAB using Cogent 2000 and Cogent Graphics (www.vislab
.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php) to present stimuli and record participants’
responses.
Four differently colored geometrical shapes (a set of blue
[red–green–blue: 0, 0, 255] diagonal lines, a purple ellipse
[255, 50, 255], a yellow triangle [255, 255, 0], and a light blue cross
[0, 255, 255]) were randomly assigned to cues A–D. For all partic-
ipants, context cue X was a dark green square (150, 150, 0). These
cues were presented against a black background. As shown in
Figure 1, these stimuli were embedded in one of two white boxes
with size 290 × 290 pixels.
The procedure of the experiment is very similar to the one
used in Experiment 3 of Le Pelley et al. (2013). Stage 1Awas a pre-
training phase to allow participants to gain familiarity with the
categorization task without the additional complexity of the
dot-probe task. The sequence of events within each trial was sim-
ilar to the one represented in Figure 1, except that the dot probe
was not presented. After a white fixation cross (20 × 20 pixels),
participants were presented two rectangles at both sides of the
screen, each contained either a predictive or contextual cue. The
assignment of distinctive cues A–D to the left/right of the rectan-
gle containing X was randomized across trials. Participants were
instructed to categorize each pair of stimuli (AX, BX, CX, or DX)
using two different responses, 1 and 2. If participants thought
that the correct category for a pair of stimuli was 1, they were in-
structed to press the up arrow key. If they thought that the correct
category was 2, they were instructed to press the down arrow key.
Although participants were not told in advance the correct cate-
gory for each pair of stimuli, they were given corrective feedback
after every incorrect response andwere instructed to use this feed-
back to learn the correct cue-category associations. During Stage
1A participants were exposed to four blocks of trials, each block
contained eight trials (four cue types [A–D] × 2 left/right cue lo-
cations) presented in random order.
Immediately after Stage 1A participants were presented with
a set of instructions alerting them to the addition of the dot-probe
task. During Stage 1B participants performed the same categoriza-
tion task, but now they also had to report the location of a dot
probe that could appear either on the cue or the contextual cue
stimulus. The sequence of events within each trial is represented
in Figure 1. After the fixation cross, participants were presented
with the two stimuli at both sides of the screen. After 250 msec
the dot probe appeared on top of the left or the right stimulus.
The dot probe was a 30 × 30 pixel red square with red–green–
blue values of (255, 0, 0). Participants were instructed to report
the location of the dot as fast as possible using the left/right arrow
keys. Furthermore, they were instructed to ignore the identity of
the stimuli until they had responded to the location of the dot.
If participants’ response was incorrect, the trial did not proceed
until they entered the correct response. After responding to the lo-
cation of the dot, the dot probe disappeared from the screen and a
categorization prompt appeared in the center of the screen.
Participants were instructed to use the up/down arrow keys to cat-
egorize the stimuli as they had done during Stage 1A. During Stage
1B participants completed 16 blocks of trials, each containing
16 trials (4 trial types × 2 cue locations × 2 dot-probe locations).
There was no interruption between Stages 1B and 2. Except for
the differences in the design summarized inTable 1, the procedure
was identical during Stage 2 testing. The outcome assignment for
cues A and B was reversed in Group Reversed, and remained the
same in Group Same. Participants completed 6 blocks of 16 trials
each before finishing the experiment.
The dot-probe data from Stage 1B and test were initially
screened to eliminate responses that could have been initiated be-
fore the stimulus was presented (,150msec), and responses clear-
ly indicative of inattention to the task (.1.5 sec). Reaction times
(RT) from trials where the position of the dot was incorrectly re-
ported were also eliminated. Then, the mean and standard devia-
tion of the remaining scores were calculated for each subject.
Scores that were more than three standard deviations away from
the mean were removed. The data were then collapsed into
Epochs for the A/B trials and the C/D trials. An Epoch consisted
of eight trials of each type. For example, the first Epoch for
dot-probe responses when the dot appeared on either the A or B
cue consisted of the average of the first two trials where the A or
B cues appeared to the left of X and the first two trials where the
cues appeared to the right of X. Epochs were calculated separately
for trials where the dot appeared on the predictive cue (A–D) and
trials when the dot appeared on the contextual cue (X). Excluded
data were simply not included in the averages.
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Experiment 2
Two hundred and five psychology students from UNED volun-
teered to take part in Experiment 2. Ninety-nine of themwere ran-
domly assigned to Group Reversed and 106 to Group Same.
Participants conducted the experiment in the same setting used
in Experiment 1. As shown in Supplemental Table S1, the design
is very similar to the one used in Experiment 1. The main differ-
ence is that during Stage 1B participants were exposed to two dif-
ferent contextual cues, X and Y. A dark green rectangle and a dark
red (128, 0, 0) rectangle were used as context cues. With the addi-
tion of the new contextual cue, the 256 Stage 1B trials were divid-
ed into 8 blocks. Each block now consisted of 32 trials (4 trial
types × 2 contexts × 2 cue locations × 2 dot locations). During
Stage 2 testing only contextual cue X was presented in all trials.
Unlike in Experiment 1, Stage 2 comprised eight blocks of trials
(instead of six). Apart from these differences, all the details in
the procedure and design were identical to Experiment 1.
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